Jul 152022
 
DPAC Logo with text underneath "Disabled People Against Cuts" and then web address dpac.uk.net

Disabled People Against Cuts is releasing a statement on this complex case to provide clarity on our position. 

In short we are both pro-choice and anti-discrimination, and we do not believe that removing rights from one group of people is the solution to achieving equality for another.

We salute Heidi Crowter as a disabled young woman motivated to take action against disability discrimination and at the same time do not agree with the legal action taken by herself, Maire Lea-Wilson and on behalf of
Maire Lea-Wilson’s son as the way to address the particular discrimination their case is ostensibly seeking to challenge.

We respect the work of Simone Aspis in trying to influence the #DownrightDiscrimination campaign around the legal challenge to be more inclusive of disabled people and to make links with campaigners
with Down’s Syndrome in order to introduce them to the social model of disability. Sadly, disabled people led campaigns and Deaf and Disabled People’s Organisations were too over-stretched to properly support their
efforts and build a big enough intervention to counter the pro-life agenda behind the campaign.

We do believe that the difference in time limits for pregnancy termination constitutes discrimination and encourages the view that the lives of disabled people are worth less than other people’s.  This is the result
of Changes to the Abortion Act 1967 introduced in Parliament through the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990. The time limits were lowered from 28 to 24 weeks for most cases while removing restrictions for late terminations in a cases including fetal abnormality.

 
We agree with the UN Disability Committee 2017 Concluding Observations recommendation: “that the State party amend its abortion law… Women ’ s rights to reproductive and sexual autonomy should be respected without legalizing selective abortion on the ground of fetal deficiency.” How to implement this in practice is not a simple task.

Under current legislation, late terminations of pregnancy for fetal abnormality may only be considered if there is a substantial risk that the child, if born, would “suffer physical or mental abnormalities that
would result in serious handicap.” Whether a risk will be regarded as substantial varies with the seriousness and consequences of the likely disability. Guidance on judging the seriousness of the disability drawn up in 1996 advises that medical professionals should weigh up factors including the probability of being able to live
alone and to be self-supportive as an adult and the likely level of dependency on others to stay healthy as well as the degree of suffering, self-awareness, ability to communicate with others and possibility for
treatment. 

The inclusion in this guidance of measures of dependence on others goes against disabled people’s independent living philosophy and against social model and human rights approaches to disability. According to these, disabled people have a right to support that enables us to have equal life chances with others; we should not be treated any differently because of needing support. 

Health economists have produced cost/benefit evaluations of different prenatal genetic screening technologies calculating savings to the economy through better detection of impairments resulting in more
disabled people aborted before birth. Such work is underpinned by a view of disabled people that is framed entirely in terms of deficit. The promotion of prenatal screening then encourages public perceptions of
disabled people as a burden on society. We know of disabled people who have been told by strangers that they should have been aborted before birth.
 
Whilst we are in favour of challenging disablism we are not in favour of any further restrictions to women’s hard won abortion rights. Removing rights to late terminations currently legislated for would represent a
regressive for women’s rights and is not something we support.

 
Whilst we might support the extension of abortion rights by removing any time limits and thus removing any differential treatment on the grounds of disability, this is not what the Crowter challenge seeks to do. 

The Crowter legal action challenges the current law in terms of the rights of an unborn disabled child and questions late terminations of a fetus “at a time when it is both viable and sentient”. If a judge was to find in favour of these grounds and to uphold the rights of an unborn child over those of a mother’s right to choose, this would have dangerous implications for abortion rights over all and open the way for attempts to introduce further time limitations covering abortion on any grounds. Women’s hard won right to choose is constantly under threat and must be defended.

We do not agree with arguments that pose the rights of one group against those of another. Divisions between different groups only help those who benefit from the exploitation and disadvantage of others. We welcome any disabled campaigners and allies who want to get more involved in the fight against all forms of oppression and towards a society that is fairer for all.

The case raises difficult issues that are highly emotionally charged, interweaving the oppressions of women and disabled people. If we ignore them, it makes it easier for those with agendas that aren’t in our interests to take control of the issues. With the correct analysis – one that understands the structural nature of oppression and seeks to unite all those experiencing different forms of oppression in fighting for social change – we can look at these questions without falling into division and fragmentation of our collective strength.